

# Input-and-state observability of structured network systems

Federica GARIN (INRIA Grenoble, France) Lund LCCC seminar, June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2017

#### **My current research interests**

- Privacy and security of cyber-physical systems:
  - Input-and-state observability (this talk)
  - Counting nodes in anonymous networks
- Urban traffic networks:

distributed optimization of traffic lights

Game theory (potential games):
 distributed algorithms to find Nash Equilibrium





## Part 1: Structural observability (classical results)

#### Part 2: Structural input-and-state observability (joint work with Alain Kibangou and Sebin Gracy)





#### **Network dynamical systems – in this talk**

Local states  $x_i(k)$ 

Network state = vector collecting all local states

Local dynamics + interactions with some other states

➡ a (linear) system

$$\left\{egin{array}{l} x(k+1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) \ y(k) = Cx(k) + Du(k) \end{array}
ight.$$

#### **Observability**

By measuring only few local states (for some time), can we reconstruct the whole network state?

#### **Classical algebraic conditions (1960-70's)**

$$\left\{egin{array}{l} x(k+1) = Ax(k) \ y(k) = Cx(k) \end{array}
ight.$$

is observable if and only if:

Kalman :

$$\begin{bmatrix} C \\ CA \\ \vdots \\ CA^{n-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

 $\begin{vmatrix} zI - A \\ C \end{vmatrix}$ 

has full column rank

PBH:

has full column rank  $orall z \in \mathbb{C}$ 

## **Graphical conditions (1980's + recent interest)**



Non-zero entries of system matrices ↔ edges in network graph



## **Graphical conditions: structured systems (2)**

• Seminal paper: C.T. Lin, Structural controllability, IEEE Tr. Aut. Contr., 1974

• Works in the 70-80's See books by Murota (1987, 2000), Reinschke (1998), and survey paper by Dion, Commault, van der Woude (Automatica 2003)

Recent revival in the context of network systems

A very popular paper (1400 citations):

Y. Y. Liu, J. J. Slotine and A. L. Barabasi, Controllability of complex networks, Nature, 2011

Many recent works in the automatic control community and in the complex networks community (computer science, physics)



#### **Structured systems – definition**

$$\left\{ egin{array}{ll} x(k+1) = Ax(k) & ext{Non-zero entries of A, C} \\ y(k) = Cx(k) & ext{are free parameters} \end{array} 
ight.$$

$$A = egin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & lpha_{14} & 0 & 0\ lpha_{21} & 0 & 0 & 0 & lpha_{25} & 0\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0\ 0 & lpha_{42} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0\ 0 & lpha_{53} & 0 & 0 & 0\ 0 & 0 & lpha_{53} & 0 & 0 & 0\ 0 & 0 & lpha_{63} & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \, C = egin{bmatrix} \gamma_{11} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0\ 0 & \gamma_{22} & 0 & 0 & \gamma_{26} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \gamma_{35} & 0\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \gamma_{46} \end{bmatrix}$$

#### **Generic results = true for almost all parameters**

Almost all = except a proper subvariety of the param. space If parameters are random, indep., continuous distribution: Almost all = with prob. 1



#### Small detour: generic rank – examples

 $egin{bmatrix} \mu_{11} & \mu_{12} \ \mu_{21} & \mu_{22} \end{bmatrix}$ 

has generic rank 2: it is non-singular, except when

 $\mu_{11}\mu_{22} - \mu_{12}\mu_{21} = 0$ 

 $egin{bmatrix} \mu_{11} & 0 \ \mu_{21} & \mu_{22} \end{bmatrix}$ 

has generic rank 2; moreover, it has rank 2 for all non-zero parameters

 $\left[ egin{array}{cc} 0 & 0 \ \mu_{21} \ \mu_{22} \end{array} 
ight]$ 

has generic rank 1



Generic rank = size of maximum matching in bipartite graph

$$Bipartite graph
Left vertex set = columns
Right vertex set = rows
Edge  $\{c_j, r_i\} \Leftrightarrow M_{ij} \neq 0$   

$$M = \begin{bmatrix} \mu_{11} & 0 & \mu_{13} & 0 \\ 0 & \mu_{22} & \mu_{23} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \mu_{34} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \mu_{44} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \mu_{54} \end{bmatrix}$$$$

Innía



generic rank = 3

#### **Structured systems – digraph**

Non-zero entries of A, C  $\leftrightarrow$  edges in digraph



 $egin{aligned} A_{ij} 
eq 0 &\Leftrightarrow ext{edge} \; x_j 
ightarrow x_i \ C_{ij} 
eq 0 &\Leftrightarrow ext{edge} \; x_j 
ightarrow y_i \end{aligned}$ 





## **Observability of structured systems (1)**

#### **Proposition**

[R.W. Shields, J.B. Pearson, Structural controllability of multi-input linear systems, IEEE Tr. Aut. Contr., 1976]

If there exists one choice of free parameters for which (A, C) is observable, then (A, C) is generically observable.

#### I.e., for a given digraph,

either the system is observable for almost all parameters, or it can't be observable, for any parameter choice.

Same for controllability, but not for all properties, e.g., **not for stability** 



## **Observability of structured systems (2)**

#### Theorem

[C.T. Lin, Structural controllability, IEEE Tr. Aut. Contr., 1974 + K. Murota, Systems analysis by graphs and matroids, 1987]

(A, C) is generically observable iff

- i) Digraph is output-connected (from every state vertex there is a path to an output vertex)
- ii) Rank condition:





## Equivalent versions of the rank condition (1)



generically has full column rank iff

Bipartite graph



has a matching of size #X

#### Remark

If A has non-zero diagonal, rank condition is always true!





## Equivalent versions of the rank condition (2)



generically has full column rank iff

In digraph  $(X) \xrightarrow{C} (Y)$ state vertices X are spanned by a collection of disjoint cycles and paths to output

А

 $x_1$   $y_1$   $y_1$   $x_4$   $y_2$   $y_2$   $x_5$   $y_3$   $x_6$   $y_4$ 



#### Equivalent versions of the rank condition (3)



#### Other classical results on observability...

- Structural observability = generically observable (for almost all parameters)
   Strong structural observability = for all non-zero parameters Characterizations of strong structural observability with uniquely restricted matchings, or zero-forcing sets
- LTV systems with constant graph: same characterization as corresponding LTI system
- LTV systems with varying graph: a characterization of structural observability with "dynamic graph"



## Structural input-and-state observability

On-going work, with Sebin Gracy and Alain Kibangou



Motivation: cyber-physical security What if an attacker injects an input in the system?

Other motivation: input can represent a fault

#### Input-and-state observability (ISO) – definition

$$\left( egin{array}{l} x(k+1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) \ y(k) = Cx(k) + Du(k) \end{array} 
ight)$$

• Strong observability: despite presence of unknown input u, can reconstruct initial state x(0) from outputs y(0), ..., y(n)

• Delay-L left invertibility:

can reconstruct input u(0) from x(0), y(0), ..., y(L)

- Left invertibility (delay-L left inv. for some  $L \le n$ ): can reconstruct input u(0) from x(0), y(0), ..., y(n)
- Input-and-state observability (ISO) (strong obs + left inv): can reconstruct x(0), u(0) from y(0), ..., y(n)
- <u>Delay-1 ISO</u> (ISO + delay-1 left inv.):
   can reconstruct x(0), u(0), ..., u(n-1) from y(0), ..., y(n)

## **ISO – algebraic characterization** (classical)

• PBH-like test: ISO iff

$$\begin{bmatrix} A - zI & B \\ C & D \end{bmatrix}$$

has full column rank  $orall z \in \mathbb{C}$ 

• Delay-1 left inv. iff

$$\operatorname{rank} \begin{bmatrix} D & 0 \\ CB & D \end{bmatrix} = \#U + \operatorname{rank} D$$

The two together give delay-1 ISO



#### **Delay-1 ISO as observability of a subsystem**

#### Assumption on matrices B, C, D:

- Each input acts on a single state
  - (columns of B have a single non-zero element, input vertices have out-degree 1);
- Each output measures a single state

(rows of C have a single non-zero element, output vertices have in-degree 1);

- D = 0 (no edge from U to Y).





#### **Delay-1 ISO as observability of a subsystem**

Under our assumption on B, C, D

**Necessary condition for delay-1 ISO:** 

All attacked sates (i.e., affected by an input) are measured

Proof: from characterization of delay-1 left inv. (in case D = 0) CB full column rank



## Delay-1 ISO as observability of a subsystem (2)

Under assumption on B, C, D + all attacked states are observed **System decomposition** 

Relabel vertices to put attacked states first:

for i = 1, ..., #U, 
$$(u_i) \rightarrow x_i \rightarrow y_i$$
  
 $B = \begin{bmatrix} I \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad C = \begin{bmatrix} I & 0 \\ 0 & \tilde{C} \end{bmatrix} \quad x = \begin{bmatrix} x_a \\ \tilde{x} \end{bmatrix} \quad y = \begin{bmatrix} y_a \\ \tilde{y} \end{bmatrix}$ 

$$egin{aligned} &x_a(k+1) = A_{aa} x_a(k) + A_{a\sim} ilde{x}(k) + u(k) \ &y_a(k) = x_a(k) \ & ilde{x}(k+1) = ilde{A} ilde{x}(k) + A_{\sim a} x_a(k) \ & ilde{y}(k) = ilde{C} ilde{x}(k) \end{aligned}$$



## Delay-1 ISO as observability of a subsystem (3)

#### Theorem

Under our assumption on B, C, D,

#### **Delay-1 ISO iff**

- All attacked states are measured
- Subsystem  $(\tilde{A}, \tilde{C})$  is observable (subsystem without inputs, attacked states and corresponding outputs)

Proof: from PBH-like characterization

Same result also for LTV (constant B, C), more tricky proof



## Delay-1 ISO as observability of a subsystem (4)

We can characterize generic delay-1 ISO using known characterization of structural observability

#### Corollary

Under our assumption on B, C, D,

Generically delay-1 ISO iff

- All attacked states are measured,
- Subsystem (A, C)
- a) Bipartite graph has a matching of size #X-#U
- b) Digraph is output-connected



And more: strongly-structural (for all non-zero param), LTV

**Proposition** If there exists one choice of free parameters s.t. (A, B, C, D) is ISO, then (A, B, C, D) is generically ISO.

**Theorem** [Based on Boukhobza et al, State and input observability for structured linear systems: A graph-theoretic approach, Automatica, 2007]



output vertex, with no essential vertex in the path



### **Essential vertices**

Linking from U to Y = set of vertex-disjoint paths from U to Y Size of a linking = # paths

**Essential vertices** 

 vertices present in all maximum linkings
 union of all minimum vertex separators



Remark: under a), size of max-linking = # U



#### **Structural ISO – Example**

a) Bipartite graphhas a matching of size #U+#X

b) In digraph, from every nonessential state vertex there is a path to an output vertex, with no essential vertex in the path





#### **Proposition**

If D=0, if there exists one choice of free parameters for which (A, B, C, D) is delay-1 left inv, then (A, B, C, D) is generically ISO delay-1 left inv.

I.e., when D=0, for a given digraph, either the system is delay-1 left inv for almost all parameters, or it can't be delay-1 left inv, for any parameter choice.

For general D, for a given digraph,

either the system is delay-1 left inv for almost all parameters, or it is not delay-1 left inv for almost all parameters (but there might be few parameters for which it is)



#### Structural delay-1 left invertibility (2)

#### Theorem

Generically delay-1 left inv. iff Exists linking of size #U + r from  $U_0 \cup U_1$  to  $Y_0 \cup Y_1$ in:



r = generic rank (D) = size of max matching in U V



## Structural delay-1 left invertibility – Example

r = generic rank (D) = 1

$$D = egin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \ 0 & 0 & 0 \ 0 & 0 & 0 \ \delta_{41} & 0 & \delta_{43} \end{bmatrix}$$

Generically delay-1 left inv: Exists linking from  $U_0 \cup U_1$  to  $Y_0 \cup Y_1$ of size #U + r = 4





**Structural delay-1 left invertibility – Example 2** 

$$B = egin{bmatrix} eta_1 & 0 \ 0 & eta_2 \ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad C = egin{bmatrix} \gamma_1 & 0 & 0 \ 0 & \gamma_2 & 0 \ 0 & 0 & \gamma_3 \end{bmatrix} \quad D = egin{bmatrix} 0 & \delta \ 0 & 0 \ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

r = generic rank (D) = 1

**Not generically delay-1 left inv:** size of max linking = 2 < #U + r

But if  $\delta = 0$  and  $\beta_1, \beta_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2 \neq 0$  it is delay-1 left inv.

$$CB=egin{bmatrix}eta_1\gamma_1&0\0η_2\gamma_2\0&0\end{bmatrix}$$



## Conclusion

#### This talk

- Structural systems: generic results, depending only on zero pattern, true for almost all paramenters
- Classical characterization of structural observability
- Recent results on structural ISO (with delay 1)

#### Current work on structural ISO

- LTV
- Strong structural (for all non-zero parameters)
- Delay-L left inv.

#### Future work

- Other notions related to attack detection
- Distributed algorithms for ISO or other defense from attacks

